Monthly Archives: June 2017

A word from our interns Aras, Gaetan and Wouter!

During the first half of 2017 we had the pleasure of working with three bright interns assisting us on various projects ranging from developing an interactive training platform to creating challenges for the Cyber Security Challenge to working on improving our own IT environment.

We asked them to let us know what they thought of their time spent here. Below is the feedback we received!


Posing in front of our beloved blue bird with a great smile! 😊

During my internship at NVISO, I assisted the company into deploying and assessing new components in the IT environment. Due to NVISO’s sector of operation, a large emphasis was placed on the security of this environment both in the cloud and on the workstations used to access the services and resources. The aim of this migration was to provide a more unified set of services with increased productivity features while maintaining a strong, secure and controlled environment.

Overall it was a pleasure to work at NVISO during my internship. Working with such a dynamic team was a pleasure, and the overall ambiance and working with like-minded people was a delight.

Personally I am proud on doing my internship at NVISO and also with his team that had respect, experience and fun.
During my internship I did two different projects:
1 – creation of the IoT village for the Cyber Security Challenge
2 – Working with open source information databases on connected devices, such as Shodan.

Thank you again guys to all great moment and your patience,

Wouter – Howest:
During my internship I worked on building the back end for an interactive training infrastructure. This infrastructure will help NVISO in improving its trainings, demonstrations and workshops. Building this infrastructure would not have been possible without the support of the NVISO team. I really enjoyed working at NVISO during my internship. The working atmosphere and colleagues are really top notch.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank you all for your commitment and enthusiasm you all brought into the workplace! Hope to see you again soon 🐀!

The entire NVISO team.

Malicious PowerPoint Documents Abusing Mouse Over Actions

A new type of malicious MS Office document has appeared: a PowerPoint document that executes a PowerShell command by hovering over a link with the mouse cursor (this attack does not involve VBA macros).

In this blogpost, we will show how to analyze such documents with free, open-source tools.

As usual in attacks involving malicious MS Office document, the document is delivered via email to the victims.
(MD5 DD8CA064682CCCCD133FFE486E0BC77C)

Using (a tool to analyze MIME files), we can analyze the email received by the user:


The output indicates that the mail attachment is located in part 5. We select part 5, and perform an HEX/ASCII dump of the first 100 bytes to get an idea which type of file we are dealing with:


A file starting with PK is most likely a ZIP file. So let’s dump this file and pipe into (a tool to analyze ZIP files):


It is indeed a ZIP file. Judging from the filenames in the ZIP file, we can assume it is a PowerPoint file: .pptx or .ppsx.

Using zipdump and option -E (the -E option provides extra information on the type of the contained files), we can get an idea what type of files are contained in this PowerPoint files by looking at the headers and counting how many files have the same header:


So the ZIP files (.pptx or .ppsx) contains 1 JPEG file (JFIF), 11 empty files and 36 XML files.

As said at the beginning, malware authors can abuse the mouseover feature of PowerPoint to launch commands. This can be done with an URL using the ppaction:// protocol to launch a PowerShell command.

To identify if this document abuses this feature, we can use YARA. We defined 2 simple YARA rules to search for the strings “ppaction” and “powershell”:

rule ppaction {
$a = "ppaction" nocase
<p style="text-align: justify;">rule powershell {
$a = "powershell" nocase

We use to apply the YARA rules on each file contained in the ZIP file:


As shown in the screenshot above, file 19 (ppt/slides/slide1.xml, that’s the first slide of the presentation) contains the string ppaction string, file 21 (ppt/slides/_rels/slide1.xml.rels) contains the string powershell.

Let’s take a look at file 19:


We can see that it contains a a:linkMouseOver element with an action to launch a program (ppaction://program). So this document will launch a program when the user hovers with his mouse over a link. Clicking is not required, as is explained here.

The program to be executed can be found with id rId2, but we already suspect that the program is Powershell and is defined in file 21. So let’s take a look:


Indeed, as shown in the screenshot above, we have a Target=”powershell… command with Id=”rId2″. Let’s extract and decode this command. First we use to extract Target values with a regular expression:


This gives us the URL-encoded PowerShell command (and a second Target value, a name for an .xml file, which is not important for this analysis). With and a bit of Python code, we can use module urllib to decode the URL:


Now we can clearly recognize the PowerShell command: it will download and execute a file. The URL is not completely clear yet. It is constructed by concatenating (+) strings and bytes cast to characters ([char] 0x2F) in PowerShell. Byte 0x2F is the ASCII value of the forward slash (/), so let’s use sed to replace this byte cast by the actual character:


And we can now “perform the string concatenation” by removing ‘+’ using sed again:


We can now clearly see from which URL the file is downloaded, that it is written in the temporary folder with .jse extension and then executed.

To extract the URL, we can use again:


A .jse file is an encoded JavaScript file. It’s the same encoding as for VBE (encoded VBScript), and can be decoded using this tool.


It’s rather easy to detect potentially malicious PowerPoint files that abuse this feature by looking for string ppaction (this string can be obfuscated). The string powershell is also a good candidate to search for, but note that other programs than PowerShell can be used to perform a malicious action.


We produced a video demonstrating a proof-of-concept PowerPoint document that abuses mouse over actions (we will not release this PoC). This video shows the alerts produced by Microsoft PowerPoint, and also illustrates what happens with documents with a mark-of-web (documents downloaded from the Internet or saved from email attachments).

“Zusy” PowerPoint Malware Spreads Without Needing Macros:
Tools used: